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Summary findings
Should fair trade rules he replaced by national or  trade remedies cases. (Thc structural impediments
international competition rules? A familiar argument for  initiative negotiations with Japan  are the most  familiar
doing so is that more rigorously enforced competition  example.) In several of these cases, the foreign
standards might eliminate the basis for the burgeoning  governm1ient  agreed to and implemenited more  rigorous
number of antidumping cases of recent years.  antitrust enforcement,  but these actions seldom ended
A less farniliar argument is that the implementation of  the dispute. The U.S. government pressed on for tangible
internationally agreed competition standards might  evidence of increased U.S. export sales.
reduce the frequency with which the U.S. government  Finger and Fung conclude that removing the basis for
uses section 301 of U.S. trade law. Section 301 lists  these disputes - alleged lax enforcement of competition
foreign government toleration  of systematic  policy  - did not remove the motive  for them-
anticompetitive activities as one of th *  bases for taking  increased U.S. exports. Competition policy then is not
retaliatory action against foreign exporters.  the antidote for  '301."
Finger and Fung found that of 82 "301"  actions taken  The last section of the paper reviews the compatibility
from 1975-92,  in only three was the uncompetitivL  of "301" with the preservation of open international
clause the basis for the complaint.  trading systen.. Of 70 "301" cases (through December
The authors found that a numnber  of additional  31,  1992) that have led to policy changes, 52 have led to
disputes involved allegations of foreign uncompetitive  liberalizations, and only 18 have led to increased trade
practices but were taken up through other mechanisms;  restrictions. Viewed from the point of view of results, the
extraterritorial  application of U.S. antitrust law or diirect  major shortcoming of "301"  is that the United States is
negotiations sometimes capped by an understanding at  the only country whose policies do not c')me under its
the presidential level. These negotiations often included  scrutiny.
the threa,t of initiation of antidumping, "301," or other
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by
J. Michael  Finger and K.C. Fung
The contributors  to this session were asked to address the following  question:  Should fair
trade' rules be rep.aced  by nanonal or international  competition  rules? Professor Messerlin  has
examined  competition  pohcy as a substitute  for antidumping,  our assignment  is to !ook in the same
way at other kinds of fair trade ru!es. We have concentrated  ca "'301,"  for obvious  reasons. "301" is
controversial  -- one of the big issues  at the Uruguay  Round. And in an important  dimension  it is
different from antidumping  and other 'trade remedies' -- it is about forcing other countries to relax
their trade barriers rather than about creating  new ones for oneself.
As we see it, the issue in this session  is discipline  over the burgeoning  use of antidumping
restrictions  and againss  the escalating  use by the United  States  of another unilateral  instrw  uit,'
"301."  In examining  "301" we will attempt  to answer the following  questions:
1.  Would  more rigorous application  in victim  countries  of competition  policy
eliminate  the basis for "301" actions?
2.  Would more rigorous application  in victim countries  dampen  the motive for
these actions?
GATT Article VI allows antidumping  actions  and the 1989  antidumping  code elaborates  the
procedures  through which they are to be decided  and applied. Since the code was implemented,
GAT'r panels have completed  reviews of five national  antidumping  actions  and have determined  that
each of the five was taken in violation  of the GATT or of the code. These five are more suitably
described as typical of rather than as exceptions  to the 2000 antidumping  cases reported to the GATT
since the code is in effect.  See Finger and Fung, 1993.Anyone who studies policy institutions  knows that the issue thiat  justifies a policy action is
often far removed frr,m the motives  that propel its advocates,  and that when push comes to shove,  it is
the motive, not the issue that dictate what the action wiU  be. Hence  the two questions are not the
same.
Section I below reviews how "301"  works, after wnich sections  II and III ask if "301"  is, in
any significant  sense, about the lack of competition  in foreign  markets. We concluded  that it is not. It
is about increased  sales of U S. exports in foreign  markets. In section IV we review  the results of
"301" actions.  This section  has two purposes:  (a) tc put aside concerns  that "301" is just another  legal
wiy to excuse trade restrictions,  and (b) to point out that the overwhelmingly  larger proportion  of
"301" outcomes  have been multilateral  liberalizations.
We conclude from the information  reviewed  in sections  II, III and IV that competition  policy
is not an antidote  for "301." The last two sections  present our interpretation  of why "301"  has been a
success for the United  States and our preliminary  thoughts on the possibility  of an intemational  dispute
settlement  mechanism  made up of national  "301s." As systemic  concems and abiding by agreed
intemational  norms seem to have little force today, to preserve  the economic  benefits  of the present
intemational  system it may be necessary  to regress  to a more primitive  political and legal system.
I. "301" -- How it Works
Section 301 (of the trade act of 1974) is part of the U.S. Congress's response  to U.S.
exporters' complaints  about foreign  practices  and policies that reduce U.S. exporters' access  to foreign
markets. As a weapon against foreign  practices,  the section ultimately  authorizes  the U.S. Trade
2Trade Representative 2 to retaliate  by reducing  foreign  access  to the U.S. market. The section, as
amended  in 1979, 1984 and 1988, explicitly  covers not only merchandise  trade, but services,
investment  and intellectual  property  as well. Cross-retaliation  is allowed, e.g., the Trade
Representative may retaliate by restrizting imports of merchandise from a country in which U.S.
investment or sales of services hac been compromised.
"301" deals with three categories  of practices  that burden or restiict U.S. comrneLce  --
unjustifiable,  unreasonable  and discriminatory.  "Unjustifiable"  is defined  as any act, po!icy  or practice
that violates the international  legal rights of the United  States -- including  (buit  not limited to) those
under a trade agreement  such as the GATT, a bilateral Voluntary  Export Restraint Agreement,  or an
agreement  that settled a previous "301" case. When  the agreement  in question  has its own dispute
settlement  process (as the GATT does) the Trade Representative  is required to submit  the mater to
that dispute  settlement  process simultaneous  with his investigation  under "301."  In U.S. procedure,
the schedule  and the terms of the "301" investigation  are dominant.
If the U.S. Trade Representative  finds  a foreign  violation  that is "unjustifiable,"  she must
retaliate.' But, the section also allows the President  to waive retaliation  if the GATT  dispute
settlement  process decides against the United  States, the foreign  government  takes action to remove  or
offset the violation,  or if retaliation  would  backfire and sigrLificantly  harm U.S. commercial  interests
or U.S. national  security.
Section  301 defines "unreasonable"  as an act, policy or practice that is unfair and inequitable,
though not necessarily  a violation  of explicit  U.S. legal rights. Specific  actions are listed as
unreasonable:  the list including  denial of workers' rights, export targeting, denial of fair and equitable
2 The secticn has been modified  and extended  in the tiade acts of 1979, 1984  and 1988.  Until the
1988  amendments,  "301" authority rested with the President.
I  Since 1S88,  retaliation  may not be on the case's subject  product or service, e.g., if the subje
practice affects US exports of rice, retaliation  cannot be a restriction  on US imports  of rice
3market opportunities,  and government  toleration  of systematic  anticompetitive  activities. 4
"Discriminatory  " means any act, policy or practice that denies national  or most favored nation
treatment  to U.S. goods, services  or investment.  Retaliatory  action in these cases is discretionary.
Besides  tightening  "regular" 301, the 1988  trade act added "Super  301" and "Special  301."
Super 301 mandates  that the Trade Representative,  in May 1989  and April 1990, submit  to Corgress
a l;st of "priority  counLries"  and "priority  practices"  that pose significant  barriers to U.S. exports.
The act also requires  the Trade Representative  to initiate investigations  concerning  each priority
practice of each priority country. Special 301 provides similar requirements  to identify  and investigate
countries  that rnaintain  significant  barriers to market access  by U.S. persons  who depend on
intellectual  property  protection.
II. "301" and Competition Policy
As we noted  above, governmental  toleration  of systematic  anticompetitive  activities  is one of
the practices that "301" defines as "unreasonable,"  and therefore a basis for retaliatory action by the
United  States. The wording in the law is as follows: 5
Acts, policies, and practices  that are unreasonable  include, but are not limited  to any
act, policy, or practice, or any combination  of acts, policies, or practices, which
denies fair and equitable  market opportunities,  including  the toleration  by a foreign
government  of systematic  anticompetitive  activities  by private firms or among private
4  The 1988  act introduced  a provision  to permit foreign  governments  to defend themselves  against
accusations  of "unreasonableness"  by pointing out that the United  States  does the same thing. (Hudec,
1990, p. 22)
Section  301(d)(3)(B)(i)(lII).  Quoted from House Ways and Means, 1993, p. 423.
4firms in the foreign  rountry that have the effect of restricting,  on P. basis that is
inconsistent  with commercial  considerations,  access  of goods  to purchasing  by such
firms.
The inclusion  of this aefinition  is by and large due to the perception  by Congress  that at least
some of the invisible  barriers in the Japanese  market stem fror. the anticompetitive  behavior  of
private firms; for exarnple, bidrigging,  group boycotts  and exclusionary  procurement  practices  by
private firms. (Bello  and Homer, 19C  ))
The U.S. Trade Representative  determines, in junction with an interagency  group, whether a
specific  practice is unreasonable  or unjustifiable.  Though the Justice Department  is part of the "301"
interagency  committee  that reviews cases, the standard  of proof to label practices  as anticompetitive
and then unreasonable  is not necessarily  the stardard required  to pursue court cases under the U.S. or
foreign  antitrust statues. According  to some officials in U.S. Trade Representative,  the determination
of an unreasonable  act is not one that requires  the same rigorous  standard  of proof as in antitrust
court cases. 6 As only one "301" action has ever been based on the uncompetitive  practices  clause, the
acceptability  of a lower standard  in "301" cases has not been thoroughly  tested legally.
Despite  the inclusion  of this designation  of unreasonable  practice, the Executive  Branch  of the
U.S. government  has to this date cited only once the anticompetitive  clause as the basis for a "301"
determination.  Instead, the Administration  has attempted  to use instruments  other than "301" to deal
with possible  articompetitive  conduct abroad. These extra-301  instrunents include  the 1992
reinterpretation  of the guidelines  for the application  of antitrust laws in overseas operation, the
Structural Impediment  Initiatives  (Sll), and ad hoc commitments  made by heads of states.
'  In parallel, the standards  of proof and evidence  required to establish  dumping  in an antidun.ping
investigation  are weaker  than those necessary  to establish  price discriminz.ion  in an antidumping  case.
Finger, 1993, ch. 2, provides documentationRegular  301 Cases Involving  Anticompentive  Practices
According  to the U.S. Trade Representative's  (mandatory)  reports on "301" to Congress,  the
case of Japan construction  and construction-related  services  (301-69) is the only case in which a
posit ve "301" determination  is based on the anticompetitive  clause. Inadequate  access  to Japan's
architectural,  engineering,  and construction  markets  has been a long-standing  U.S. concern. Until
1987, U.S. companies  had received  only small  contract awards totaling  about  $1.6 million  for
contracts  given on the $8 billion Kansai  International  Airport (USTR, 1987). Section 1305  of the
1988  Trade Act required the USTR  to initiate  an investigation  regarding  acts, policier and practices
of the Japanese  govemnment,  and of entities  ownei, financed, or otherwise  controlled  by the
government  of Japan, that are barriers in Japar,  to the offering of performaiice  by U.S. persons  of
architectural,  engineering,  construction  and consulting  services in Japan. On November  21, 1988, the
U.S. Trade Representative  initiated  such an investigation.
The U.S. Trade Representative's  investigation  concluded  the Japanese  govermeiit's practices
to be unreasonable,  and a burden to U.S. commerce,  that the Goverrnment  of Japan implemented
procurement  policies in the construction  sector in a way that limited  competition  and facilitated
collusive  bidding  practices, including  inadequate  use of administrative  measures  restricting  collusive
activities,  and operation of the designated  bidder system. In other words, the U.S. Trade
Representative  concluded  that the Government  of Japan did tolerate anticompetitive  practices  by these
constiuction  companies  and thercoy  did impede  sales of foreign construction  firms.
On April 26, 1991, U.S. Trade Representative  proposed  to impose  restrictions  on the
provisions in the U.S. by Japan of such services. No Japanese  contractor  would be eligible  to ener
into contracts for such services with certain  federal agencies.
On July 31, 1991, an agreement  was reached through an exchange  of letters and thus no
retaliation  action was taken under 301. This agreement  extended  the 1988  Major Projects
6Arrangement  (MPA). The 19' 1 agreement  proviLedi  for special measures  designed  to facilitate  foreign
access  to 23 additional  piojects, worth an estimated  $26.7 bi'lion. This brought to 40 the number  of
public works construction  projects covered  by sucn measures.
Since  the original ag,zement in,  May 1588, 12 U.S. contractors  have obtained  construction
licenses  to work in Japan, and eight companies  have  registered  as first-class  architects' offices. As of
December 1992, U.S. firms had been awarded  a t3tal of approximately  $463 million  in conLracts  for
MPA projects. Prior to the MPA, Tl.S.  Airffs  had complained  that they had virtually  no access to the
public work market in Japan.
As stated earlier, the Japanese  public constriction  case is the only case in which the
anticoinpetitive  section  of "301" was used by LJSTR  as a basis for positive  de:ermination.  There are,
however, two other instances  where the 301 petitioners  invoked  the 301 anticompetitive  clause in their
petitions. One instance is the issue of access to the Japanese  market of amorphous  metals, a high
technology  product  -ised primarily  to improve  efficiency  in electric power .ransmission.  On March 5,
1990, Allied-Signal  Inc., a U.S. firm with patent rights to amorphous  metals, filed a "301" petition
against  Japan. Allied-Signal  Inc. alleged  that it had been denied market access to Japan through a
combination  of Japanese  targeting and toleration  of anticompetitive  practices (USTR  301 Report  to
Congress,  July-December  1990). One complaint  was that the Japanese  government  allowed a boycott
by Japanese  electric utility companies  of purchases  of clearly  superior amorphous  metal transforners.
Allied-Signal  Inc. also accused the Japanese  government  of tolerating  the refusal by certain individual
Japanese  companies  to negotiate  separate license  agreements  with Allied which "'ould allow Allied to
enjoy significant  participation  in the Japanese  market.
On April 18, 1990, the Administration  obtained  a commitm?.it  from the Japanese  government
to engage in negotiations  on m-  -et access in Japan for amorphous  metals. Rather than starting a one-
year section 302 investigation,  the Administration  used the leverage  of the pending  petition  to obtain a
7coniumitmeni  from Japan to cont..iue  negotiations  for finding  a solution  to this issue within 150 davs.
Allieu-Signal  thereafter  withdrew  its petition. Negotiations  were  completed  with a joint announcement
in September 1990.  One result  was that the government  of lapaii agreed to require Japanese  utilities
to evaluate  bids using standards  similar to those applied  by U.S. utilities  in their pur%hases.  In
addition, Japanese  utilities  would buy from Japanese  manufacturers  ?2,000 units of arr,orphous  metal
transformers  over two years in order to conduct  tests to see whether  the amorphous  metal
t-ansformers  can be effectively  mass-produced  in Japan. The transformer  manufacturer  would, in
turn, buy amorphous  metals  produced in the U.S. or by a licer,see  of Allied-Signal.  This test was set
up to allow Japancse  manufacturers  to achieve  economies  of scale and to acquire know-how  in
production  of amorphous  metal transformers.  It would also allow  the pertormance  of amorphous
metal transformers  to be co'mpared  with the performar.ce  of their substitute,  silicon steel tran,sformers.
The agreement  did not provide for any market share allocation  or for any purchases  after the
completion  of the test period. As a result of this resolution,  Allied-Signal  announced  that it would not
re-file its petition (USTR  301 Report to Congress,  July-December  1990).
A second instance  in which the petitioners  (P&M  Cedar Products,  Inc. and Hudson ICS)
argued that foreign practices  are unreasonable  because  of toleration  of anticompetitive  conduct is the
case of Indonesian  pencil slats, snall wooden  boards used in the production  of pencils (301-90).  The
petitioners,  competitors  to the Indonesian  government  in both the U.S. and in third markets as
suppliers of these slats, alleged  that in addition to export  targeting, the Indonesian  government  had
been encouraging  vertical integration  of Indonesian  logging  and processing  activities. They also
accused  the Indonesian  government  of not promoting  competition  in the logging  industry and  of nax
protecting  the interests  of the consumers.
On October  2, 1992, the USTR initiated  an investigation  to determine  whether the allegations
contained  in the petition  warranted actions. Based on the investigation,  USTR  determined  tha fators
8other than the practices  alleged  in the petition  appeared  to have a much  greater impact  on prices of
Indonesian  logs and thus pencil slats. These factors included  (1) exchange  rate changes  favoring
Indonesian  exports since 1985  and (2) labor  and transportation  cost advantages  enjoyed  by the
Indonesian  producers. Based  on the results of this investigation,  USTR  deterrnined  that there was no
evidence  that the alleged  practices  were having  the adverse  trade effects  asserted  by the petitioners.
Thus, even assuming  that the alleged  practices  existed  and would otherwise  be actionable  under
section 301, there was no basis for concluding  that they were burdening  or restricting  U.S.
commerce. On December  31, 1992, the USTR  determined  that no action was appropriate  in this
investigation  and that it should  be terminated.
Though the anticompetitive  clause  of "301" did not come about until 1988,  there have already
been references to anticompetitive  practices  in the earlier 301 case of the U.S. - Japanese  dispute  over
U.S. imnports  and exports of semiconductors.  In fact, some former U.S. government  officials have
claimed  that the anticompetitive  section  of "301" was written with the Japanese  semiconductor
industry in mind. The initial "301" petition,  filed on June 14, 1985, by the U.S. Semiconductor
Industry Association,  alleged  that through a series of policies which existed until 1974-75,  the
Government  of Japan created a market structure in which the semiconductor  industry is dominated  by
a small number  of major semiconductor  consuming  companies  that have strong, interlocking  ties with
respect to research and development,  production  and sales, and that this market structure constitutes  a
barrier to the sale of foreign semiconductors  in Japan. The practices  which allegedly  created this
market structure included:  (1) restrictions  of entry into the semiconductor  industry except by the
large, established  electronic  producers; (2) concentration  of semiconductor  subsidies  and R&D aid to
the largest electronic producers;  (3) pressure on semiconductor  to buy Japanese;  and (4) formal
restrictions  on foreign imports  and investment  (Federal Register, p. 28866, 1985).
9The U.S. industry also brought a series of antidumping  cases against  Japanese  producers
exporting  to the U.S. market. The antidumping  cases and the "301" case reached a joint negotiated
agreement  signed on September  2, 1986.  The Japanese  government  agreed to provide  fair and
equitable  access to its domestic  market for foreign  semiconductor  products  and to prevent  dumping  by
Japanese  exporters  both in the U.S. and in third countries.  More specifically,  in the market access
portion  of the agreement, the government  of Japan committed  to impress  upon Japanese
semiconductor  producers  and users the need to aggressively  increase  market access opportunities  in
Japan for foreign-based  semiconductor  firms; and to provide  further support for expanded  sales of
foreign-produced  semiconductors  in Japan through  establishment  of a sales assistance  organization  and
promotion  of stable long-term relationships  between  Japanese  purchasers  and foreign-based
semiconductor  producers. The U.S. and Japanese  governments  agreed that the expected  improvernent
in access by foreign-based  semiconductor  producers  would be gradual and steady  over the period of
the arrangement.  In the area of dumping,  the government  of Japan committed  itself to encourage
Japanese  semiconductor  producers  to stop dumping.  The Japanese  government  further committed  itself
to monitor custs and export prices on semiconductor  products exported  by Japanese  semiconductor
firms from Japan in order to prevent dumping.  The agreement  would be in effect until March 31,
1991.
On April 17, 1987, President  Reagan  determined  that the Government  of Japan had not
implemented  or enforced  major provisions  of the agreement. Specifically,  the U.S. government
decided that the government  of Japan had not met its commitments  to increase  market access
opportunities  in Japan for fore gn-based  semiconductor  producers  or to prevent dumping  through
monitoring  of costs and export  prices of exports from Japan of semiconductor  products. In the
language  of "301", these omissions  by Japan were unjustifiable  and unreasonable  and constituted  a
burden or restriction  on United  States commerce.
10Acting  under "301" authority, the President  increased  duties on selected  imports  from Japan,
including  certain color televisions,  power hand tools, and automatic  data processing  machines. On
June 15, 1987, USTR suspended  the increased  duties imposed  on 20 inch  color televisions  because  of
improved  compliance  of the agreement.  Based  on the Department  of Commerce's  monitoring,  the
prices of Japanese  DRAMs  (dynamic  random  access  memory  semiconductor  chips) had increased,
which reduced  dumping. However,  Japanese  EPROMs  (erasable  programmable  read only memory
semiconductor  chips) were still sold at an "unfairly"  low price. Furthermore  the access  of foreign-
based companies  to Japan's semiconductor  market had not improved  (Federal Register, p. 22693,
1987).
On November  9, 1987, USTR  further suspended  increased  duties on certain  power hand tools,
18 and 19 inch color televisions  and low performance  16-bit  desktop computers  from Japan. This
suspension  was a result of price increases  of EPROMs  and DRAMs  that eliminated  the "unfairly' low
pricing (Federal Register, p. 43146-43147,  1987).  The remaining  April 1987  duty increases  were
suspended  when a new agreement  was reached  in 1991.
The 1991  semiconductor  arrangement  came into effect on August 1, 1991, replacing  the 1986
arrangement.  Like the 1986  agreement,  the new arrangement  contained  provisions  to address the
market access problems  U.S. semiconductor  manufacturers  face in Japan as well as dumping  of
semiconductors  by Japanese  suppliers. The new aspect of the 1991  agreement  was the explicit
reference in the agreement  to the U.S. expectations  that foreign semiconductor  manufacturers  could,
through continuous  efforts by both foreign  suppliers  and Japanese  users, attain a 20 percent market
share by 1992.' Though the agreement  pointed  to the 20 percent target, its meaning  --whether it is
'  According  to sources from the U.S. industry  (Howell, Barlett  and Davis  p.81, 1992), a secret side
letter was exchanged  concurrently  with the text of the 1986  semiconductor  arrangement. The side
letter also referred to the 20 percent market share. The existence  of the side letter was revealed  by the
publication  of Clyde Prestowitz's  book Trading  Places. MITI had denied the existence  of the letter.
I1mandatory  or just hortatory--  remained  far from clear. According  to the agreement, the 20 percent
target was not a floor or a guarantee. But the government  of Japan considered  that the target could be
realized and welcomed  its realization.  Both sides also agreed to assess the growth of design-ins
(development  of new semiconductors  for use in future products)  and long-term  relationships  between
foreign  manufacturers  and Japanese  user companies  when  determining  whether  progress in market
access  had been achieved.
From the U.S. standpoint,  however, it soon became  evident  that for the U.S., the 20 percent
foreign  market share was the bottom line. Unless  foreign (mostly  U.S.) market share is close to 20
percent, all other factors, long-term  relationshilc, Japanese  goverrunent's  effort, design-ins,  market
conditions,  etc, no matter how favorable, would  not be sufficient  to make the Japanese  semii.-  .
market "open".
The U.S. government  all along pushed for assured  purchases  from U.S. suppliers, th. n^:¶e:
of the uncompetitive  arrangements  among  Japanese  companies  was marginal  to the agreement. To
quote what President  Reagan  once said about the 1986  semiconductor  agreement,  the agreement
"achieves  a key objective  of Section  301. which is to open foreign markets  to U.S. exports. The
satisfactory  resolution  of this problem  demonstrates  our ability  to help U.S. industries  and to resolve
contentious  trade disputes  through the negotiating  process." (Federal Register, p. 27811, 1986).  In
other words, 301 in general and the semiconductor  agreements  in particular are about helping U.S.
industries  to increase  sales abroad, not about uncompetitive  conditions  in the foreign rrarket. This
emphasis  on "achieving  results" has become an important  feature of negotiations  between  the U.S.
and Japan. Indeed,  the Clinton administration  has headlined  its attention  to pursue a "results  oriented'
trade policy.
I _Super 301 designation
The Administration  had an opportunity  to tackle  cases involving  perceived  anticompetitive
practices  in Japan when it had to designatr'  countries and practices  under Super 301. Within
Washington,  "everyone  knew" that Japan would  be one of the designated  countries:  the Congress
would insist. There remained  however  the question  of what Japanese  practices  would be cited. U.S.
officials  reviewed  Japanese  practices  toward three industries  for possible  designation:  auto parts. soda
ash and private construction  projects  (Mastanduno  1992).
In the case of soda ash, U.S. firms had since the 1970s  alleged  that the Japanese  producers
had organized  a group boycott  of imported  products, thereby  effectively  holding down the U.S. share
of the Japanese  market to about 2 percent. The U.S. firms also complained  that their market share
was blocked  because the Japanese  competitors  controlled  the distribution  network  and enjoyed close
ties with users of soda ash. Spurred by industry  pressure to self-initiate  a "301" investigation,  the
U.S. government  pressed the Japanese  government  to take action. In 1983, the Japan Fair Trade
Commission  (JFTC) investigated  and later confirmed  that indeed  there was a group boycott. The
JFTC then issued a cease and desist order. As a result of this action, the U.S. share of the Japanese
soda ash market increased  to 17 percent. In 1986,  the J7-'C again investigated  the industry and issued
a warning to the producers not to violate  the Japanese  Antimonopoly  law. Subsequently,  the U.S.
market share rose again to 22 percent. Perhaps because  of the improvement  of their market  share  in
Japan, the U.S. industry  did not press for a Super 301 designation.
For the case of auto parts, the main issue was the network  of suppliers  and users that  are in
long-term relationships--the  so called keiretsu. The U.S. firms had complained  for a long tnme  that
even though they had been successful  in the U.S. and third markets, they were unable to penetrate  the
Japanese  market. A Super 301 designation  would likely have had support in Congress. A section  of
the 1988  Trade Act was devoted to Fair Trade in Auto Parts, calling  upon the Secretary of Comnmierce
13to establish  an initiative  to increase  the sale of U.S. parts to Japan. The industry  and the United  Auto
Worker  (UAW)  petitioned  the U.S. Trade Representative  to select Japanese  auto parts as a priority
practice  under Super 301.
In the area of private sector construction,  the U.S. suppliers  complained  of "dango", the
practice  of rigging bids and rotating winning  bids among  Japanese  subcontractors.  They also
complained  that the Japanese  subcontractors  refused to deal with U.S. firms seeking  to bid on big
projects.
In each of the above  cases, anticompetitive  behavior is in some way invoked  as e' -narket
access barrier. No Super 301 case under the rubric of government  toleration  of private anticompetitive
practices  was designated (Federal  Register, p. 24438-24442,  1989).  But ultimately,  the Administration
chose not to designate any of these cases under Super 301. There are two reasons  as to why this is the
result. One is that t'he Bush  Administration  decided  that anticompetitive  practices  can best be pursued
by other instruments. For example,  anticompetitive  practices  were explicitly  discussed  under SII.
Under SII, the Japanese  would  make commitments  in six areas: saving and investment  patterns, land
policy, distribution  system, exclusionary  business  practices,  keiretsu relationships  and pricing
mechanisns. All except the first two have implications  for policies toward anticompetitive  practices.
To satisfy Congress' wish to attack  anticompetitive  practices  in Japan, the Administration  created SII
and claimed  that issues  of anticompetitive  acts would  be solved via an alternative  mechanism.
However, though conimitments  are made in Sll, there is much more flexibility  under that forum than
Super 301. U.S. officials are not bound by any precise legal language.
Another reason why the Administration  was reluctant  to designate  these practices  was perhaps
due to the difficulty  of actually  justifying  the assertion  that the Japanese  government  tolerated these
practices,  even if the U.S. officials  were convinced  of their existence. At least in the case of soda
ash, the JFTC did intervene  twice in an effort to reduce activities  of group boycott  and consequently
14improve  market access for the American  firms. For the case of Japanese  private sector construction
there was also an ongoing investigation  involving  public  construction  projects  based on uncompetitive
practices  under the regular 301. Much of the complaints  are similar to those in the private
construction  case. The fact that there was an ongoing "301" investigation  may have swayed  the U.S.
officials  in their deliberations  for Super 301 designations.  Finally, it should also be noted  that another
frequently  mentioned  candidate  for Super 301 designation  was the case of semiconductors  (Bello  and
Holmer 1990). Some of the market barriers  mentioned  by the industry  also involve  the keiretsu. But
semiconductors  were already governed  by a bilateral  agreement  since 1986, and the usefulness  of an
additional  Super 301 designation  may be seen as somewhat  questionable.  Ultimately  the case of
semiconductors  was not designated  under Super 301.
III. Other Instruments to Deal with Perceived Anticompetitive Practices
We pointed  out earlier that where the U.S. government  has seen lack of competition  or failure
to enforce competition  rules as a significant  deterrent  to U.S. exports the U.S. government  has
generally  used instruments  other than "301." The following  describes  these extra-301  instruments.
Presidential Commitments
One mechanism  to deal with cases that have antitrust implications  is through "ad hoc"
Presidential  commitments.  The general sequence  of events is as follows: a particular  U.S. industry
has relatively  little success in Japan and wants to improve  its sales. It goes to Congress  as well as the
Administration  to complain, often threatening  to file for a "301" investigation.  This pressure causes
the Administration  to initiate consultations  with Japan. Consultation  goes on without  breakthrough.
15The dispute festers and the  pressure rises as the industrv  increasingly  lobbies  the government.  To
forestall increasing  trade tension, the Administration  uses special  events such as Presidential  visits and
announces  that the two heads of states have agreed that a settlement  has to be reached  by a certain
date. This creates pressures  on the trade negotiators,  who then scramble  to reach a compromise  to
meet the deadline, diffusing  or delaying  confrontations.
Several agreements  were reached as a result of the presidential  trip to Tokyo in January 1992.
Two of them, the computer  and the paper agreements,  specifically  contain implications  for
competition  policy.
For the computer  case, the U.S. computer industry  asserted that in the 1960s  and 1970s,  the
Japanese  government  practiced  explicit "Buy  Japanese"  policy in procuring  computers.  This enabled
the Japanese  computer  firms to estabiisn a long-term  relationship  with the procuring  agencies  and lock
out foreign firms. Even though the explicit "Buy  Japanese"  policy no longer existed, the computer
procurement  practices  prior to the agreement,  which included  reliance on vendors for technical  advice
and inadequate  bid protest procedures, were still causing  difficulty  to the U.S. industry. To back up
their claims, the U.S. computer industry  pointed  out that foreign computer  manufacturers  had 41
percent of the private sector mainframe  computer  market in 1990, while  the share of the central
government  market remained  at less than one percent (USTR  Foreign Trade Barriers, 1993).  The
computer industry  had asked the U.S. government  to pursue  the government  procurement  issue
formally with the Japanese  government. This prompted USTR  to raise the issue with the Japanese in a
Trade Committee  meeting  in 1989  (Trade Committee  meetings  are regular meetings  between U.S. and
Japan to discuss  current and potential  bilateral trade problems).
The computer agreement  was concluded  on January 22, 1992. The U.S. Trade Representative
and the Japanese  ambassador  exchanged  letters on "Measures  related  to Japanese  public sector
procurements  of computer  products and services."  Major provisions  include  the establishment  of
16mechanisms  by the Japanese  government  to facilitate  procedures  for the enforcement  of the
Antimonopoly  Act in the public sector, equal access to pre-bid information,  a commitment  to
formulate  technical  specifications  in a neutral. non-discriminatory  manner. the establishment  by the
Japanese  government  of an impartial  bid protest  system to provide  equitable  and effective bid
challenge  procedures  and to make transparent  criteria (such as the performance  of specific computer
functions)  used in evaluating  competing  bids.
According  to the computer  agreement,  the United  States  government  will meet with the
Government  of Japan periodically  to assess the implementation  of the agreement  based upon the
following  information:  annual  purchasing  data for all Japanese  public  sector procurements  of
computer products and services  from both foreign  and domestic  manufacturers;  similar data that is
publicly available  for private sector procurements;  efforts by fcreign computer  manufacturers  to
increase their Japanese  public sector participation,  and the growth in the Japanese  public and private
computer  sectors. Though the agreement  does not specify  the share that U.S. firms should get, the
periodic review  of these data would undoubtedly  put pressure on the Japanese  government  to procure
more foreign computers  and allow more sales by U.S. companies.
Another  agreement  reached as a result of the Presidential  commitment  made in Bush's trip to
Tokyo is the paper market access agreement.  U.S. suppliers  of paper and paperboard  products
complained  to the U.S. government  that they cannot make full use of the Japanese  industry's
distribution  system. According  to the U.S. industry, the Japanese  distribution  system is characterized
by stable, long-term  relationships  and capital linkages  between  Japanese  manufacturers  and their
distributors. Alliances  between  producers  and distributors  in Japan prevent the substitution  of foreign
made paper products for domestically  produced  paper products. The U.S. industry's assertion is at
least partly confirmed  by the JFTC , which In 1986  noted its concern about the ability of foreign
paper manufacturers  to obtain  access to d3mestic  users and the distributional  channels (U.S. Trade
17Representative  Foreign Trade barriers 1992). The U.S. firms further  complained  that Japanese  end
users of paper told them that they did not want to displace  Japanese  paper producers  who have been
supplying  the users with paper over a period  of time. At stake here was the S27 billion Japanese
market for paper and paperboard  products.
The U.S. industry  had indicated  that they would file a "301" petition  if there was not a
settlement  soon. Using  the Presidential  visit, President  Bush and Prime Minister  Miyazawa  agreed
and publicly stated that by the end of March 1992,  the two governments  would  agree on measures  to
substantially  increase  market access for foreign  firms exporting  paper products to Japan.
On April 5, 1992, the U.S. and Japanese  governments  reached an agreement.  The agreement
requires  the goverrunent  of Japan to encourage  Japanese  paper distributors  and major users to increase
imports  of competitive  foreign  paper products;  develop long-term  buyer-supplier  relationship  with
foreign producers; establish  and implement  open and non-discriminatory  purchasing  practices and to
prepare and adopt company-specific,  written purchasing  guidelines,  applicable  to both domestic  and
foreign suppliers. In addition, the Japanese  government  will encourage  major Japanese  producers,
distributors  and users to establish  and implement  Anti-Monopoly  Act compliance  programs. The
Japanese  government reaffirmed  its commitment  to effectively  enforce the Anti-monopoly  Act with
respect to the paper market. As part of the agreement,  the Japanese  government  will conduct  a
number  of surveys on conditions  in the Japanese  paper market and on the specific efforts of various
paper consumers  to use foreign paper products. Both governments  will review  jointly on a semiannual
basis progress in implementing  the measures  in the agreement,  taking into consideration  changes  in
the level of import penetration,  trade data, and efforts of both governments  to implement  the
measures  (USTR Foreign Trade Barriers, 1993, USTR  Press Release  92-20, 1992).  The U.S. industry
and the U.S. officials  will focus their attention  on changes  on the level of import  penetration  as the
18critical factor. As in the computer  agreement,  the review  process will generate  pressure for the
Japanese  government  to act to increase  sales by U.S. paper suppliers.
To make sure that the meeting  between  President  Bush  and Prime Minister  Miyazawa  was
seen by the media as a political  and diplomatic  success, the Japanese  government  also gave out some
"gifts" unilaterally.  As discussed  earlier in the paper, the U.S. auto parts industry  has for some time
complained  that the close and durable intercorporate  relations  among auto and auto parts
manufacturers  make it difficult for foreign auto  parts suppliers  to compete  with the Japanese  suppliers
(U.S. Trade Representative  Foreign Trade Barriers 1993).  At the end of Bush's visit, the Japanese
government  pledged  to increase  the total purchase  of American  auto parts (including  local
procurement  in the United  States  and export  to Japan) from $9 billion in FY 1990  to about $19 billion
in FY 1994.
All these issues involve  alleged anticompetitive  practices  as market access  barriers to various
degrees. Both governments  had paid some attention  to these trade issues  before the presidential  visit.
For example,  since 1986, the U.S. and Japanese  governments  had been working together  under the
Market-Oriented  Sector  Selective  (MOSS)  framework  to improve  market access  to Japan for foreign
auto parts suppliers. In 1990, the two governments  agreed on a Market-Oriented  Cooperation  Plan
(MOCP) intended  to facilitate  the development  of long-term  business  relations between  Japanese  auto
manufacturers  and U.S. auto parts suppliers. However, these  cases, if unresolved,  could have led to
"301" investigations  eventually.  But President  Bush  decided  to use his visit to forge agreements  and to
obtain pledges  to deal with these trade tensions.  This mechanism  helped the U.S. industry to increase
sales and at least delayed any potential "301" petitions.
19Structura!  impediment  initiative  (Sll)
Sll was created  by the Administration  as an alternative  to 301 and Super 301 to satisfy
indus.rv and Congressional  desires to tackle  competition-related  trade barriers in Japan and to deal
with the current account imbalance  with Japan. Under Sll, there are six areas of commitments  for the
Japanese:  saving and investment  patterns, lana policy, distribution  system, exclusionary  business
practices,  keiretsu relatioriship  and pricing mechanisms  (U.S.-Japan  working group, 1990). Under Sll,
the Japanese  government  has committed  to improve  competition  policy and its implementations.
First, under the Japanese  comraitment  "Enhancement  of the Antimonopoly  Act and its
enforcement"' the U.S. is able to get Japan to agree to increase  resources at the JFTC (U.S.-Japan
Working  Group, 1992). As a result, the government  of Japan has acted to strengthen  the enforcement
arm of the JFTC by increasing  the investigative  staff of the JFTC by about 38 percent since FY1989.
With these new resources, the JFTC has stepped  up their investigations.  In FY 1991, the JFTC took
30 formal actions  against Antimonopoly  violation,  more than 4 times the average number  of actionc
taken in the six years prior to SII. The JFTC also imposed  a record level $97 million in
administrative  fines in FY 1990.
Under SII, the government  of Japan also committed  to bring more criminal  enforcement
actions  against hard core antimonopoly  violations  including  price fixing, bidrigging, market
allocations  and group boycotts.  The Ministry of Justice, Public  Prosecutor's Office and the JFTC
jointly established  a permanent  liaison mechanism  to facilitate  the developir-t  of cases fcr criminal
prosecution.  This new mechanism  has led to the first criminal  antimonopoly  action in 17 years. In
November 1991, a case was brought against 8 firms and 15 individuals  that had engaged  in a price-
fixing cartel in the plastic food wrap industry.
The Japanese  Government  also agreed to increase  certain fines. As part of the Japanese
comnitment, the Ai'timonopoly  act was amended  to raise the surcharges  JFTC automatically  imposed
20on companies  committing  the most serious antimonopoly  violations.  JFTC will now assess large
manufacturers  and service providers  a surcharge  of 6 percent  of the value of their commerce  affected
by the anticompetitive  activities, four times higher than before. While this is a significant  increase, it
still falls short of the 10 percent that the U.S. government  wanted.  The Japanese  government  has also
submitted  legislation  that would increase  the maximum  penalty  for criminal  violations  of the
Antimonopoly  act more than 20 fold -- from about $35,000  to about $750,000.
Under the SIl commitments,  the JFTC also issued  new antimonopoly  guidelines  that clarified
and strengthened  the JFTC's enforcement  policy with respect to unlawful  distribution  practices and
activities by keiretsu  or corporate groups in Japan. The JFTC is following  up by investigating  and
conducting  detailed  analysis  of keiretsu practices  in four sectors: automobiles,  auto parts, paper and
glass.
In addition, the Japanese  government  agreed to increase its efforts to eliminate  bidriggirg on
government  funded projects in Japan. To this end, the JFTC has taken eight enforcement  actions
against  bidrigging  activities in the last 2 years.
To meet the commitment  to promote effective  resource  to private damage remedies for
antimonopoly  violations, the JFT(' has adopted  a number  of administrative  measures.  The JFTC will
preserve  evidence it obtains  in hs investigations,  and upon request  of the court, will submit  these
materials  to the court for use ir private damage litigation.  The JFTC also will provide the court with
its detailed  analysis  of the anount of damages  suffered by the plaintiff  and the causal link between  the
violation  and those damagcs.
There are also other changes  that would facilitate  competition.  For example, under Sll an
improvement  was made in the revision  of the large-scale  retail store law. Under the amendments,  new
opening  or expansion  up to 1000  square meters  of floor space for import  sales in a large scale retail
store is exempted  from coordination  procedures  after notification.  This change  will facilitate the entry
2 Iof new products, including  imports.  Toys R Us is one store that was opened  successfully  in Japan
under the revised retail store law.
Tf.. JFTC has also committed  to a reduction  of Antimonopoly  exemptions,  including  certain
cartels in the textile industry, and certain  exempted  items in cosmetics  and pharmaceuticals.  To deter
infringement  of the Antimonopoly  act, including  bid-rigging,  the procurement  entities  will be assigned
a contact person with the JFTC to provide  information  concerning  practices  that may violate  the
antitrJst laws.
Extraterritonral application of antitrust law
Another instrument  which was initiated  under the Bush Administration  to deal with foreign
anticompetitive  practices  is the 1992 reinterpretation  of the overseas operation  of antitrust
enforcement.  On April '"  1992, the U.S. Department  of Justice announced  a change in antitrust
enforcement  policy th:t would permit the Justice  Department  to challenge  foreign  business  conduct
that harms American  -..ports when the conduct would  have violated  U.S. antitrust laws if it took
place in the United States.
According  to then Attorney  General William  Barr, this change is meant to be a way to use the
American  antitrust laws to remove illegal barriers to export competition.  He said, "Our antitrust laws
are designed  to preserve and foster competition,  and in today's global economy,  competition  is
international."  (Department  of Justice Press Release, 1992).
The change in enforcement  policy supersedes  a footnote  in the Department  of Justice's 1988
Antitrust  Enforcement  Guidelines  for International  Operations  that had been interpreted  as foreclosing
Department  of Justice enforcement  actions  against  anticompetitive  conduct in foreign  markets unless
the conduct resulted in direct harm to U S  Lonsumers.  The new policy represents  a return to the
Department's  pre-1988 position  on such matters
.2Under the new policy, the Department  of Justice  can take antitrust  enforcement  action against
conduct occurring  overseas that restrain U.S. exports, whether  or not there is direct harrn to
American  consumers,  whtn (1) the conduct  has a direct, substantial,  and reasonable.  and foreseeable
effects on exports of goods  or services  from the U.S.; (2) the conduct  involves  anticompetitive
activities  which violate  the U.S. antitrust laws--in  most cases, group boycotts,  collusive  pricing, and
other exclusionary  activities;  and (3) U.S. courts have jurisdiction  over foreign  persons or
corporations  engaged in such conduct  (Statement  of Antitrust  Enforcement  Policy, Department  of
Justice, 1992).
In the Department's 1977  Antitrust  Guide for International  Operations,  two purposes  are
identified  by the Antitrust  laws' application  to trade: to protect consumers  and "to protect American
export and investment  opportunities  against  privately  imposed  restrictions"  (put aside by the 1988
Guidelines).  The concern is that each U.S.-based  firm engaged in the export of goods, services  or
capital should be allowed to compete  on the merits and not to shut out by some restrictions  imposed
by a bigger or less principled  competitor."  (1977 Antitrust  Guide cited in Background,  Antitrust
Enforcement  Policy, Department  of Justice, 1992).
The Department's 1977 Antitrust  Guide for International  Operations  thus allowed  for actions
against export-restraining  conduct, even in the absence  of direct harm to U.S. consumers. In 1982,
for example, the Antitrust Division  challenged  a foreign  buying cartel for fixing  the prices its
members  paid Alaskan seafood processors  for crab exported to Japan (U.S. v. C. Itoh & Co. et. al
1982-83).  The Japanese  cartel had branch offices  in the United  States that are not independemly
incorporated.  Thus the Justice Department  could established  jurisdiction. The case was finally sealed
by a consent  decree. In fact, going back to 1912, the Department  had brought over 40 antitrust cases
based in whole or in part on allegations  that the foreign  conduct harmed U.S. exports.
23According  to the views  of the Justice  department,  the Supreme  Court has also confirmed  that
the antitrust laws can apply to anticompetitive  conduct  that impeded  U.S. export opportunities.  In
Zenith Radios Corporation  v. Hazeltine  Research  Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), the Court sustained
7enith's antitrust challenge  to activities  of a Canadian  patent pool whose  members  conspired  to give
licenses  only to firms manuracturing  in Canada,  and to refuse licenses  Zenith needed  to export U.S.-
made radios and televisions  to Canada.
The Justice Department  also stated  that they will continue  the practice  of notifying  and be
prepared to consult  with foreign governments.  Export-restricting  conduct  may also violate  antitrust
laws of the country where the conduct took place. Where foreign  antitrust authorities  are in a better
position to remedy unlawful  conduct, the Justice Department  will be prepared to work with those
authorities.
Current  negotiations  with Japan
As described  above, past Administrations  have utilized "301" only minimally  as a way to deal
with perceived  anticompetitive  practices  abroad. Instead,  they relied on other instruments  to pressure
foreign governments  to reduce  these activities.  Some, such as the cormmitments  at the Presidential
levels, are ways to bypass  the bureaucratic  channels  to reach a quick agreement, in order to defuse
potential  trade tensions  that may jeopardize the overall international  relationship.  Others, such as the
SII and the extraterritorial  application  of the U.S. antitrust laws, are ways to strengthen  the process of
competition  policies, either via increased  enforcement  in Japan, or through the threat of applying  the
more rigorous U.S. antitrust policies abroad. Stronger competition  laws and enforcement  are then
believed to lead to a more open market.
The Clinton Administration,  it seems, has decided  that strengthening  the antitrust process in
Japan is no longer a sufficient  or quick  enough way to deal with competition-related  trade barriers.
24The new Administration  has been outspoken  in advocating  a results-orientud  policy toward Japan: this
objective  pursued  through continued  pressure at the level of heads of states, witness  the framework
agreement reached  at the July summit in Tokyo. The two heads of states  further agreed to meet twice
a year to review progress  toward meeting  the objectives  of the framework  agreement.
The framework  agreement  sets up the rules by which a future set of agreement  will be
negotiated. For the subsequent  sets of agreements,  there will be more detailed  macro and micro
components.  The Clinton administration's  initial  bargaining  position  was to seek quantitative  targets in
both areas. In the framework  agreement  that emerged in Tokyo the Japanese  pledged  to reduce
substantially  their current account surplus.  On the micro side, the two sides agreed that objective
criteria will be used, both quantitative  and qualitative,  to evaluate  the progress  in each of the
component  areas.
There are five components  to the rnicro  side of the framework.  They include  Japanese
governmnent  procurement,  particularly  in relation  to foreign  computers,  supercomputers,  satellites,
medical  technology,  and telecommnunications;  regulatory  reform, covering  financial  services,
insurance, the distribution  network  and competition  policy; other mnajor  secEors  particularly  auto and
auto parts, economic  harmonization  addressing  issues  affecting  two-way  foreign direct investrnent,
intellectual  property  and access to technology;  and the imnplementation  of existing  and future
agreements.
So far there are already different interpretations  to this framework  agreement.  The Japanese
stated that there will be no hard and fast numerical  targets, especially  targets  that will be used in
sanctions. But President  Clinton  has said," At least we have agreed what the outcome  of these
negotiations  needs to be: tangible,  measurable  progress,". (Wall Street Journal, July 12).
From the U.S. side, this emphasis  on targets represents  a continuation  of the approach
adopted  under the semiconductor  agreement.  But it is a clear change  from the approach  of the SUl.
25Under SII, after the macro topic of saving  and investing,  competition  policy has been the most
important  area of discussion.  But the new administration's  framework  agreement  suggests  that while
competition  policy will be one of the component  for negotiations,  it will not be a primary one. Topics
more  directly related  to U.S. sales in Japan have higher priority.
In opting for results, not processes,  the current Administration  in some cases will have to rely
on agencies such as the Ministry  of International  Trade and Industry (MITI), which traditionally  have
been tolerant of dumestic anticompetitive  behavior, to issue more guidance  to the private sectors and
pressure the industries  to purchase  more foreign  products. Rigged  markets  and managed  trade will be
tolerated, so long as they are rigged  or managed  in favor of U.S. sales. "301" is in the background,
for use when the Administration  needs legal authority  to retaliate  against  unilaterally  determined
violations  of agreements  (including  possibly  failure to flesh out the framework  agreement)  when U.S.
sales in Japan are below the aspirations  of powerful  constituents.
Alternatively,  the current emphasis  on the target approach  can be interpreted  to mean that in
fact the preferred substitute  to "301" is old-fashioned  managed  trade. On the import side, there have
always  been import maxima.  Now on the export  side, the U.S. government  is striving  for export
minima. Neither "301" nor the successor  to SII is about competition  policy.
To summarize,  there are three main points to the above  discussion:  (1) Foreign
anticompetitive  practices  are only a very small percentage  of the scope of "301", (2) the U.S. has
other tools to attack conditions  of competition  in foreign  countries, including  SII, commitments  by
heads of states and extraterritorial  application  of antitrust laws, and (3) changing  the "background
conditions"  such as the degree of competition  is less the U.S. objective  than increasing  U.S. sales.
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Since "301" was created in the 1974  trade bill, the U.S. Trade Representative  has opened  a
total of 90 investigations,  82 of which have been completed 9 -- this count based on the most recent
U.S. Trade Representative  table of cases, dated  October  2, 1992  and Report  to Congress  on Section
301 Developments,  July-December  1992. Of the eight "pending"  cases, six were suspended  when the
target country  agreed to take up the matter in a multilateral  negotiation.' 0 The other two are recently
initiated investigations  that have not come to the mandatory  completion  date.
Foreign  liberalization  has been the most  frequent outcome
As the Congress was making "301" into an important  instrument  of U.S. trade policy,
knowledgeable  observers  expressed  concern that it would  be used as a protectionist  instrument  -- that
its attacks on foreign barriers would  be attractive  excuses for retaliatory actions  to restrict access to
the U.S. market." "301" can be criticized  over many  dimensions,  but our tabulation  of
investigations  and outcomes indicates  that its primary function  has not been to provide  the U.S.
government  with an excuse  to restrict imports.  Table I reports that the most frequent  outcome of a
case is for the target country to liberalize  the policy that the "301" case attacked.
I The outcomes  of "301" cases have been tabulated  independently  by Finger (1991)  and Bayard  and
Elliot  (1992).  The following  discussion  closely follows  Finger (1991).
9  USTR (1992) reports 28 petitions  that did not lead to investigations.
'°  All six are on topics being negotiated  at the Uruguay  Round. Three concern  disputes over
European  Community  agricultural  subsidies, that date back as "301" cases to 1981. A fourth,
concerning  Argentine  marine insurance,  began in 1979. The last two are over the Super 301
designation  of Indian investment  practices  and Indian insurance.
Helen Milner  (1990) reviews these concernsTo understand  what the numbers in the table signify, the reader should be aware that from
time to time, before  a net liberalization  is reached, a trade dispute  goes through intermediate  stages of
retaliation  by the United States,  and counter-retaliation  by the target country. For example, the
National  Pasta Association  filed a petition  on October 16, 1981,  alleging  EC violation  of GATT
Article  XVI and the GATT Subsidies  Code in using pasta export subsidies  that resulted in increased
imports  into the United  States. The U.S. Trade Representative  initiated  an investigation  and consulted
several  times with the EC. U.S. Trade Representative  also refereed  the matter to the GATT Subsidies
Code for conciliation.  In 1982, a dispute  settlement  panel was established:  consideration  of its
findings  extended  into 1985. In 1985, the United  States  increased  its customs duties on pasta imports  -
- technically,  in retaliation  for the EC's discriminatory  citrus tariffs. The EC counter-retaliated  on
lemons  and walnuts.
In August 1986  the U.S. and the EC agreed  to end their retaliatory  and counter-retaliatory
duties and to negotiate  in good faith toward a settlement  to the pasta dispute. In August 1987  the U.S.
and the EC reached  tentative agreement  by which the EC would  eliminate  export subsidies  on half the
pasta exported to the United  States. The U.S. Customs  Service is now monitoring  that agreement.
Most of the induced liberalizations  have been multilateral
rather than preferential  to the United  States
Table 1 sorts foreign liberalizations  into two categories,  multilateral  or bilateral. The pasta
case ended with arn  action by the EC that would  benefit only U.S. producers. Another case that ended
with a bilateral liberalization  began with a petition in 1976  the United  Egg Producers  complaining  of
a Canadian import  quota on U.S. eggs. Eventually,  Canada  agreed to double the U.S. quota. In a
more recent case that ended with a bilateral  concession,  the Amtech  Corporation  (a U.S. company)
complained  that Norway denied U.S. rights under the GATT government  procurement  code. and  in
so doing adversely  affected U.S. (i.e., Amtech's sales) of highway  toll electronic identificaon
28equipment.  In the end the Norwegian  government  agreed to several actions  to offset the impact  of
their procurement  practices on the petitioner.  One of these  was to clarify that the Amtech  system met
the requirements  of the Oslo Toll Ring project, another was to provide  a statement  that the Amtech
system has been found to be proven, reliable, competitive,  and type-approved  by the Norwegian  PTT.
While a number of countries  found responses  that benefitted  only the United States,  Table 1
shows that almost three times as often the liberalization  was a multilateral  action -- something  that
would benefit all exporters, not just the United  States. 12 In 1979, in response  to an investigation
sterming  from a petition  by the National  Canners  Association,  the EC agreed to discontinue  a
minimum  import  price system  that had been applied to imports  of canned fruits, canned  juices and
canned  vegetables.  In another multilateral  action pressed for by a '301" case, Taiwan in 1986
abolished  a schedule  for assigning  customs  duties that departed from the principle  of basing such
duties on invoice values. And a "301" case filed by the Florida  Citrus Mutual was part of the build-
up to agreement  by Japan to eliminate  quotas on imports  of fresh oranges and orange  juice. An
intermediate  stage, involving  enlargement  of import  quotas, was skewed  perhaps toward (he United
States.  11
Many of the disputes were with the EC over agriculture
Tables 2 provides information  on the distributions  of "301" cases across subject  matter. By
far the biggest lump of cases were about EC agricultural  policies. Subsidies  were the subject  of many
2 According  to Bhagwati  (1990, p. 35) US Trade Representative  Carla Hills pledged  that market
openings resulting  from "301"  actions would be multilateral.
13  Multilateral  reductions  of trade barriers will, of course, favor countries  that are the "principle
suppliers" of the products on which barriers have been reduced. The point applies to the non-tariff
barriers that "301" has attacked  as well as to the tariff concessions  that have been agreed at the GATT
rounds of tariff r,egotiations.
29of them, though there were other issues, such as the displacement  of U.S. exports when Spain and
Portugal  joined the EC.
'Traditional is  sues"  were disputed with developed countries,
"new issues"  with developing countries
Half of the cases that targeted  a developing  country  were on subjects  that the Uruguay  Round
labels "new issues"  -- services, intellectual  property, and investment  regulations  that affect trade. In
contrast, disputes with developed  countries  were almost all over "traditional  issues" -- restrictions  that
limited  access of U.S. merchandise  exports to foreign markets. (Table 2)
End result: multilateral liberalization, not new trade restrictions
The pressure of "301" may not have been the only impetus for many of the policy actions that
terminated  the cases - and may even in some cases have slowed  the target country's implementation
of a reform it had already decided  --  but qualifications  aside, the pattern of these policy actions
snould  be noted. Counting  the one case that ended  with a liberalizing  action by the United States  (see
the footnote  to Table 1), two-thirds  of completed  cases ended with a liberalizing  action. Twelve
petitions  were dismissed  as not justifying  any action, leaving three times as many liberalizing
outcomes  as restrictive  outcomes.
V. "301," An Institutional Analysis
"301" needs fixing  - the abundance  of criticism  it has attracted  both inside  and outside the
United  States attests to that. But is it worth fixing: might abolition  be the better alternative?
"301" itself is not a GATT violation,  and beyond that, there are two arguments  for fixing
rather than abolishing. For one, the results of '301" have been mostly  multilateral  liberalizations,  not
30trade restricting  retaliations  by the United States.  (Section  IV, above) For another, in the United
States,  something  like "301" will be a necessary  domestic  part of a stronger international  mechanism
for enforcing  GATT rules.
"301" is not a GATT violation
"301" may generate  some outrageous  results, but as GATT law has been applied, the GATT
enforcement  process would probably  not uphold a suit against it. Take for example  the case against
the EEC's anti-circumvention  regulations  (EEC Council Regulations  Nos. 2176/84 and 2423/88). The
GATT panel that evaluated  this case did not find the regulations  themselves  to be a violation  of the
EEC's obligations  under the GATT -- only that duties imposed  on imports  from Japan (who had made
the complaint  to GATT) under the regulations,  or undertakings  agreed by the EEC in lieu of such
duties were in violation. (GATT 1990, p. 77)  Though  the EEC anti-circumvention  regulations
authorize  duties or undertakings,  they do not mandate  them: the EC Commission  has discretionary
authority not to act. Thus the panel noted  that "the EEC would meet its obligations  under the General
Agreement  if it were to cease to apply the provision in respect of contracting  parties." (ibid, p. 76)
Robert Hudec (1990, p. 124) explains  that regulations  such as "301" that provide for but do
not mandate  retaliation  are difficult  to distinguish  from other political bluster, threats and posturing
that are the usual idiom for such trade disputes.
The domestic dimensions of "301"
The international  dimension  of "301" is familiar: it is the policy instrument  through which the
U.S. government  presses a foreign  government  -- by threatening  retaliation  - to change its  policies
31in a way that the U.S. wants. But "301" also has important  domestic  dimensions  whiich  are perhaps
less well understood.
Without "301", It would be difficult  for the lJ.S. government  to effectively  enforce U.S.
rights under the GATT. Suppose  the U.S. government  took the issue of a foreign  import restriction  to
the GATT, the GATT determined  that the U.S. complaint  was valid  and in turn asked the foreign
government  to bring itself into accord with its obligations  under GATT -- implicitly,  to remove  the
trade restriction. Suppose  further that the foreign  government  persistently  refused to do so and the
GATT eventually  authorized  the U.S. government  to retaliate, by imposing  an equivalent  import
restriction.
Under the U.S. Constitution,  the Executive  branch  of government  conducts  international
affairs, hence the GATT case would be pursued  by the Executive.  The Constitution  however gives to
Congress  the authority  to lay and collect taxes and to regulate  commerce  with other nations. Thus,
when the GATT authorized  the U.S. to retaliate,  the President  would  be unable to do: he would not
have the authority under U.S. law. Congressional  enactment  of the authorized  retaliation  would be
tedious, and difficult  to constrain  to the dimensions  of retaliation  that the GATT had authorized.
Thus under its constitution,  for the United  States  to be a functioning  part of an effective
international  system for realizing  GATT rights, something  like "301" is necessary.
The strength  of "301,"  internationally
The domestic  politics of "301" is not of course to provide the president  the legal means to
retaliate when the GATT authorizes  the U.S. to do so. In domestic  politics, "301" is a mechanism
32through which a private U.S. party with a conmmercial  interest at stake in U.S. rights under the
GATT may compel the U.S. government  to act to seize those rights." 4
In the language  of bargaining  theory. '301" influences  the bargaining  situation  between  the
United  States and the target country  -- the country  the United  States  is pressing to relax an import
restriction  or other impediment  to a U.S. enterprise  doing profitable  business  in that country. In
simple terms, the U.S. bargaining  position  will be stronger the more highly the target country values
access to the U.S. market and the more credible  is the U.S. threat to retaliate  -- to reduce  this
access  -- if the target country  does not give in. The existence  of "301"  does not aftect the value to the
foreign country  of access to the U.S. market, but it does affect the credibility  of the U.S.
government's threat to retaliate if the target country  government  does not give in.
Allow us to explain. Suppose  the decision to retaliate  against  the foreign  country rested with
the U.S. government.  The U.S. government  is equally  accountable  to those U.S. interests that would
benefit from the target country's liberalization,  those U.S. interests  that would suffer from the target
country's possible counter-retaliation,  and those U.S. interests  that would suffer from the general
"foreign  policy" costs of U.S. retaliation.  Through "301," the Congress  has shifted  authority over this
decision to the interest that would benefit from foreign liberalization,  and who has a smaller stake in
possible foreign  counter-retaliation  and the foreign  policy costs of U.S. retaliation.' 5
4  "301" is, of course, more than that.  We will take up its additional  dimensions  below.
'5 Discussions  sometimes  represent  the last fifteen or so years as a period in which the Congress  has
reclaimed  from the Executive  its authority over the regulation  of commerce  with foreign nations
While it is true that the Congress  has acted to weaken  the Executive's  authoriiy in this area,  the
Congress  has not taken upon itself the responsibility  of exercising  that authority. By expanding  the
trade remedies laws -- that are the principal US instrument for regulating imports -- and likewise
expanding  301, the Congress  has reassigned  authority over the regulation  of US trade with foreign
countries to the private parties with a direct commercial  interest in the benefits  of each action. but not
in the costs.  This is the intersection  of Congress' motivating  concerns, blame avoidance  and
constituent  service. On the former, see Nivola  (1993) and on the former, see Milner (1990O
33Private  motives and public  issues
Anyone who studies public policy soon learns that the issue that justifies a policy action is
often far removed  from the motives  that propel its advocates,  and that when  push comes  to shove, it
is the motive, not the issue that dictates  what the action will be. Some discussions  criticize "301
because  it is based on private rather than public priorities."1  While public action should be taken
only when the public interest  will be served, policy-making  cannot suppress  or even ignore private
motives. All dogs have fleas, therefore all dogs have legs with which to scratch. Likewise,  all
governments  must have mechanisms  to deal with citizens' requests  for protection  from import
competition. "301" suggests  that they should have mechanisms  to deal with constituent  concerns for
better access to foreign  markets.
The challenge is not to suppress  private pressures  for trade policy action, but to screen them
more effectively  to approve  only those petitions  that serve the overall national  economic  interest.
Whe' the issue is an antidumping  or other restriction  on imports  into the United States, there is an
obvious  conflict  between  the U.S. private interests  that compete  with imports  and U.S. private
interests  that buy imports  or import competing  products. The national  economic  interest -- the sum of
the economic  interests  of all U.S. citizens  -- will often  be reduced  by such actions. The antidumping
and other import remedy rules are not a sensible  basis to decide when it is or is not in the national
economic  interest to restrict imports."
6 For example, Palmeter  (1990).
''  One way to limit actions under import remedies  to those that will add to the national  economic
interest is to screen petitions according  to the criteria of antitrust law.  Another would be to provide
the same standing  in law and in administrative  processes  for the US interests  that will bear the costs
of an import restriction  as the administrative  import remedies  already provide for those who enjoy the
benefits of such actions. The problem with the import  remedies is not that they empower  too many
private interests, but that they empower  too few.
34But removing  a foreign  barrier to U.S. exports initiates  no such conflict. An import restriction
has a primary impact  on both U.S. buyers of imports  and of U.S. producers  of competing  products.
Creating a new opportunity  will have a primary impact  on U.S. exporters,  but only secondary  effects
on other U.S. interests -- through bidding  up prices of the U.S. products for which new export
opportunities  were created.
Rallying  then the appropriate  domestic  interests  might be an effective  way to bring U.S.
import relief mechanisms  under control. But "301" has no direct enemies  among domestic  U.S.
commercial  interests. Bringing "301" under control will depend on arousing the U.S. leadership
community's  sense of international  responsibility.
VI. Strengthened GATT Enforcement Based on "301"
The GATT dispute settlement  mechanism  has authorized  retaliation  only once in GATT's 46
years -- that one time in 1954. This outcome  displays  less the success of GATT in maintaining
discipline  than the concern of GATT's drafters  to prevent countries from retaliating  in beggar-thy-
neighbor  fashion against  another a country's new trade restriction.  Before  the GATT process comes
to retaliation  there would be (1) consultation,  (2) conciliation,  (3) a panel review  (all of these
designed  to facilitate  a "mutually  agreed  solution"  between  the contesting  countries),  then (4) a
membership  vote to make official the panel's finding  and recommendations,  then (5) a membership
vote to authorize the complaining  country  to retaliate.
"301" is effective, but it is an international  rogue. In the "301" process, the two decisions  (1)
that U.S. rights have been violated,  and (2) to retaliate,  are national,  not international  decisions.  And
of course, the criteria against which a foreign  countrv is judged goes beyond  explicit international
35agreements  -- to behavior  that is "unreasonable  or discriminatory"  in the unilateral  view of the United
States.
There is however a need for a more forceful  approach  to enforcing  international  rules than the
GATT dispute settlement  process provides. 1. M. Destlei (1992, p. 242) in arguing  that "301" should
be maintained  as an instrument  of national  policy, lists the following  reasons:
1  There remain many  arbitrary foreign  practices  that close potentially  lucrative
export markets.
2.  The GATT process has not proven an effective  process for addressing  these
arbitrary practices.
3.  An idle mind is the devil's workshop; i.e., to many members  of the U.S.
Congress, the alternative  is likely to be tougher restrictions  on imports.
This reasoning  can be made international  by pointing  out that there remain  many arbitrary
United  States  practices that the GATT  process has not effectively  addressed. The absence  of foreign
instruments  to attack similarly  arbitrary U.S. practices  is not the fault of "301."
Maintaining  international  peace among  nations  all armed with policy instruments  like "301"
requires  significant  progress in at least five problem  areas.
One problem is how to make the foreign "301's" as effective  as the U.S. instrument.  The
threat of reduced access  to a small country's market is not as powerful as the threat of reduced access
to the U.S., the EEC or the Japanese  market. But the present  GATT process suffers the same
weakness  -- it does not offer the possibility  of comrnmunity-wide  retaliation  against  a country  that has
violated its international  obligations  vis-a-vis  a smaller country.
There is another reasDn  why foreign  countries' "301s"  might be less effective  than the U.S.
instrument. As discussed  above,the effectiveness  of "301" is not based solely  on the size of the U.S.
market. It is based also on the credibility  of the U.S. threat to retaliate,  and tha. credibility  derives
36from the willingness  of the U.S. Congress  to transfer  authority over U.S. trade restrictions  to private
commercial  interests. A government  that transfers such authority  to private parties in an attempt  to
increase  the credibility  of its retaliation  threat would  not be successful  in doing so. The credibility  of
the U.S. threat derives from the entire politics  of this transfer  of authority, from a folklore that is
deeply held and would not be put aside simply because  doing so might at some point improve  the
U.S. bargaining  position  on a commercial  issue.
Secondly,  for an international  dispute  settlement  process made up of national  "301's" to be
effective, it miight  be necessary  to leave the decision  to retaliate  a national  decision. GATT, (or any
other intemational  agreement)  as now would  decide when  the GATT (or the other agreement)  had
been violated,  but would sacrifice  to national  processes  the decision  to retaliate. GATT article XIX.3,
in allowing automatic  compensation  or retaliation  rights to a country  against whose exports another
has taken a safeguards  action, might be a model.
It is also evident that an international  system composed  of national "301's" cannot work
without  more responsible  behavior  by the United  States. Robert  Hudec (1990, Appendix  2) documents
the following  record of compliance  with GATT legal rulings returned between  January 1, 1980  and
December  31, 1988.
Japan: out of 4 adverse  rulings substantial  compliance  in all 4.
Canada:  out of 6 adverse  rulings, compliance  in 4, noncompliance  in 1, the other was too
recent at the time of hudec's analysis  to allow a conclusion.
EEC: out of 9 adverse  rulings, compliance  in 3. In another 3 adoption  of the ruling was
blocked  but the case was eventually  settled with a compromise.  The other 3 were too recent at
the time of his analysis  to allow a decision.
United  States: Of 9 adverse  rulings, the U.S. complied  in 3 and did not in five, though in
three of the five the U.S. has announmed  that it intends  to comply.
37Of the three instances  in which  the U.S. complied  with a GATT legal finding  against  the
U.S., the complying  action came in one case 30 months after the GATT ruling  and in another, 26
months. According  to the timetable  of "301," a foreign government  taken to GATT by the United
States would have at most 7 months  after the GATT ruling to comply.  Otherwise "301" requires
retaliation.  Hudec further points out that "the  United States  has recently  reaffirmed  its disregard  of the
new 301 time limits in no less than four other pending  cases." (1990, p. 141)18
A final (for this paper) problem is that some of the problems  with the present international
trading system are not GATT-illegal.  The new issues, such as services, are an obvious  example.
Reluctance  of developing  countries  who have  become significant  powers in international  trade to give
up special and differential  status, the expansion  of the scope of antidumping  restrictions  are others.
The dispute settlement  process includes  no commitment  from the community  as a whole ;o
act against a member who violates  the agreement  and it is constrained  by an institutionalized
reluctance  to authorize,  retaliation  by a member forward enough  to call out another one for having
violated  the agreed norms. The present  GATT dispute  settlement  process depends  simply on
normative  pressure -- reminding  an out-of-line  country  of a previously  agreed international  standard.
The driving force behind  GATT's trade liberalization  successes  has often been more
mercenary  than that -- an urge for access  to foreign  markets, and a willingness  to allow foreigners  to
sell in the home market only when it was the necessary  price of access  to theirs. Appeal  to normative
standards seems to have little force today, hence  to preserve the economic  benefits of the open
international  trading system, it may be necessary  to regress to a more primitive  political and legal
system.
18 Hudec (1990) and Palmeter  (1990) place the blame for the roguery of "301" on the determinedly
blind and awesome  self-righteousness  of the US Congress  on trade issues. One might also pcint to
the US Congress' tendency, when pressed by circumstances  to clarify US interests,  to do so hv
delegating  another piece of its authority  over the regulation  of trade to the particular  special interest
that will pay the largest bundle of constituent  service points for that authority. Which is servant  and
which master, the blind self-righteuusness  or the 'renal politics?
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40Annex
Cases Involving  the Anticompetitive  Practice Clause of Regular 301
1. Japan construction  and construction-related  services  (301-69)
Petitioner: USTR
Complaint:  The Government  of Japan implemented  procurement  policies in the construction  sector
that limited competition  and facilitated  collusive  bidding. Section 1305  of 1988  Trade Act required the
USTR  to initiate  an investigation  regarding acts, policies,  and practices  of the Japanese  government
that are barriers in Japan to the offering of performance  by U.S. persors of architectural,
engineering,  construction  and consulting  services  in Japan.
Determination:  Positive  determination  based on the anticompetitive  clause  of Section  301
Result: No retaliations  taken. An agreement  reached that extended  a previous  agreement in the
construction  sector. The new agreement  provided  for special measures  to facilitate  foreign access  to
23 additional  projects, worth an estimated  $26.7 billion.
2. Japan amorphous  metals
Petitioner:  Allied-Signal,  Inc.
Complaint:  Allied-Signal  alleged  that it had been denied market access  to the Japanese  amorphous
metals market through a combination  of Japanese  targeting  and toleration  of anticompetitive  practices.
Allied-Signal  also accused  the Japanese  government  of allowing  Japanese  utilities  to evaluate
transformers  by a method  that favored  Japanese  suppliers.
Determination:  With the conclusion  of the agreement,  Allied-Signal  withdrew  the petition.
41Result: No retaliations  taken. An agreement  was reached that committed  Japanese  utilities  to buy
transformers  based on a method  called "lowest  lifetime  cost", which was the method used in the
United  States. The agreement  also committed  the Japanese  utilities to buy from Japanese  transformer
manufacturers  32,000 units of amorphous  metal  transformers  over two years. The transformer
manufacturers  would, in turn, buy amorphous  metals produced  in the United  States  or by a licensee
of Allied-Signal.
3. Indonesian  Pencil slats (301-90)
Petitioner:  P&M Cedar Products, Inc. and Hudson ICS
Complaint:  The Indonesian  government  engaged  in activities  that target exports of wood products,
including  pencil slat. They also accused  the Indonesian  government  of encouraging  vertical integration
of logging  and processing  activities,  not promoting  competition  in the logging  industry and not
protecting  the interests of the consumers.
Deterrmination:  Negative  determination  based on USTR's conclusion  that other factors other than
those alleged by the petitioners  appeared  to have a much greater impact  on Indonesian  pencil slats.
There was no basis that these practices  were burdening  or restricting  U.S. commerce.
Result: USTR determined  that no action was appropriate  and the case was terminated.
42Table I
United States  "301"  Cases  Completed  through December  -1, 1992
by  Outcome  and  Country  Group
Other
Target  country,  Total  Negative  Tarpet  Countrvy  Liberalization  US  Restrictive
by group  Determination  Multilateral  Bilateral  Total  Retaliation  Outcomes!
All CountriesO
Number  of cases  82  12  38  13  51  13  5
(% of total number)  (100)  (15)  (46)  (17)  (62)  (16)  (6)
Developed  Countriesi
Number  of cases  50  7  17  10  27  10  5
(% of total number)  (100)  (14)  (34)  (20)  (54)  (20)  (10)
Developing  Countries
Number  of cases  31  4  21  3  24  3  0
(% of total number)  (100)  (13)  (70)  (10)  (80)  (9)  (0)
Source Tabulated  from Office of the US Trade Representative,  "Section 301 Table of Cases,"  Washington,  DC, USTR,
October  2, 1992, photocopied  and Report  to Congress  on Section  301 Developments,  July - December 1992.
a/  In three of these, on the US govemment's  recommendabon  the petitioner withdrew  his "301" petton  and
petitioned  instead  for an import-restricting  action - an antidumping  or a safeguards  action  One of the others
was the earlier Canadian  softwood  lumber case (301-58),  in which Canada imposed an export tax  The fifth
was the Japanese semiconductor  case in which  Japan agreed to import more US semiconducto  and to
observe  a minimum price on Japanese  sales  in third markets.
b/  In 1979  a US firm complained  about the Swiss customs  service's  testing  of the gold content of eyeglass
frames. USTR's investigaton revealed  that US standards  of testing and making  gold content  weu  ddrnt
from those used by many  other countnes.  The US industry  agreed to shift  to the more common  standards  and
markings  which the Swiss customs  service  would accept  without further testng. This action is classid  as
"liberalization  by the US," and does not fit into any of the categories listed in this table.Table 2
Subjects  of US "301" Cases,  July  1975 - December  1992
(number  of cases)
.Mierchandise  Trade  Services  Intellectual  Government  Investment  Several  Total
Agriculture  Manufactures  Trade  Property  Procedures!  Regulations  Subjects
All Countries
Number  of cases  42  24  11  8  2  1  2  90
(% of total number)  (47)  (27)  (12)  (9)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (100)
Developed  Countries
Number  of cases  31  19  3  0  0  0  0  53
(% of total number)  (58)  (36)  (6)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (100)
Developing  Countries
Number  of cases  11  5  7  8  2  1  2  36
(% of total number)  (31)  (14)  (19)  (22)  (6)  (3)  (6)  (100)
Source:  Tabulated  from Office of the US Trade Representative,  "Section 301 Table of Cases,"  Washington,  DC, USTR,
October  2, 1992, photocopied  and Report  to Congress  on Section  301 Developments,  July-December  1992.
a/  Customs  valuation and import licensing  procedures.Appendix  Table I
United  States  "301" Cases, Julv  1975 - December  1992
Bv Country and Outcome
(number  of cases)
Other
Target  Countrv  rotal  Vegative  Tareet  Counti-  Liberali.ed  LS  Restrictive  Pending
tfultilateral  Bilateral  Total  Retaliation  Outcome
Developed  Countries
Austria  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0
Canada  8  1  0  2  2  3  2  0
European  Community  29  6  9  4  13  6  1  3
Japan  12  0  8  3  11  0  1  0
Norway  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  0
Sweden  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0
Switzerland'  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Developing  Countnes
Argentina  5  0  3  0  3  1  0  1
Brazil  5  1  4  0  4  0  0  0
China, Peoples Republic  3  0  3  0  3  0  0  0
Guatemala  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  0
India  4  0  1  0  1  1  0  2
Indonesia  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
Korea  8  0  5  2  7  1  0  0
Taiwan  6  2  4  0  4  0  0  0
Thailand  3  0  1  0  1  0  0  2
Eastern  Europe
USSR  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
,11  Countriest
Number  of cases  90  12  38  13  51  13  5  8
(% of total)  (100)  (13)  (42)  (14)  (57)  (14)  (6)  (9)
Developed  Countnest
Number  of cases  53  7  17  10  27  10  5  3
(% of total)  (100)  (13)  (32)  (19)  (51)  (19)  (9)  (6)
Developing  Countries
Number of cases  36  4  21  3  24  3  0  5
(% of total)  (100)  (11)  (58)  (8)  (75)  (8)  (0)  (14)
Source:  Tabulated  from Office of the United States  Trade Representative,  "Section 301 Tables of Cases."  Washington,
D.C., USTR, October  2, 1992, photocopied  and Report to Congress  on Section  301 Developments,  July -
December 1992.
a/  In 1979 a US firm complained  about the Swiss customs  service's  testing  of the gold content of eyeglass
frames.  USTR's  investigation  revealed  that US standards  for testing  and making  gold content  were
different from those used by many other countries  The US industry agreed to shift to the more common
standards and markings  which the Swiss customs  service  would accept  without further testing. This action
is classified  as "liberalization  by the US," and does not fit into any of the categories listed in this table.Policy  Research Working Paper  Series
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